What Surge?

An anonymously-penned Chuck Spinney-penned analysis of the surge — "The Urge to Surge" — is circulating the ‘net, and has this to say about the supposed boost to forces in Iraq: The combined number of coalition troops in Iraq – American and allied – is 173,500. This number is noticeably below the previous peak of […]

An anonymously-penned Chuck Spinney-penned analysis of the surge -- "The Urge to Surge" -- is circulating the 'net, and has this to say about the supposed boost to forces in Iraq:

The combined number of coalition troops in Iraq – American and allied – is 173,500. This number is noticeably below the previous peak of 183,000, which occurred in November and December of 2005 (the time of the last Iraqi elections), and a fraction of a percent below the highest level that was previously maintained for a period of five months (174,500, from December 2004 through April 2005).

Cue graph!

Urge

"Today’s strategy apparently concentrates a greater percentage of total forces in Baghdad than was the case a year or two ago," "Urge" continues:

Hence, troop levels in and near Baghdad may possibly exceed the highest levels recorded before 2007. If your goal is nothing more than to hold Baghdad, then a modest increase in total troop strength in Iraq, relative to recent levels, may be enough for that limited mission. However, it is hard to think that such a limited mission as likely to turn the tide in Iraq. Pushing insurgents out of Baghdad may simply transfer violence elsewhere, and we would have fewer troops available elsewhere than we did in 2005.

A_rock_and_a_hard_place_by_leavetheBingo! says Army of Dude, one kick-ass Army blogger now on his way out of Iraq. (That's one of his pics at left.) He recalls when just two companies of Strykers were ordered to take the entire city of Baqubah:

Since Baghdad was the showcase of the war and Baqubah was brimming with super IEDs taking our Bradleys and Abrams tanks, it was decided that a unit needed to be sent there to assist the cavalry unit who averaged a death per week. But how many to send? Someone, somehow, somewhere decided that two companies of Strykers would be adequate to take down what Al Qaeda had deemed their headquarters in Iraq. What came about this oversight? Two hours into the first mission, my friend was killed in a massive IED blast that busted the hell out of the squad leader’s face, resulting in traumatic brain injury and facial reconstruction surgery. The vehicle commander tore his ACL from the concussion. Shrapnel being thrown around the inside of the truck caught one dude in the knee as a dude in the back hatch got rattled around, bruising his back as the other in the hatch was thrown completely out the vehicle. He’s been quiet since then, and was sent home soon after. Returning fire from us and the Bradleys killed an untold number of kids unlucky enough to be in the school next to our position. A wrecker sent out to pick up the destroyed Stryker was the next victim of an IED explosion, killing two men inside. Two more wreckers were sent out, one for the Stryker, one for the now totaled wrecker. As we pulled out that evening, local Iraqis, men, women and children, danced in celebration by the massive crater where the Stryker had been. At once we realized reinforcements were needed but we didn’t get any for two more months. Many more men were killed because we were stretched to our operational breaking point. But there was always more to do. Whoever made the decision to send less than an infantry battalion should be in jail right now.

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